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NONLINEAR PRICING WITH IMPERFECTLY INFORMED
CONSUMERS
Mark Armstrong
Nu¢ eld College, Oxford
November 1996
A monopolist sells a single product to a population of consumers. The cost per
unit of supplying this product is constant and equal to c. Consumers have utility
functions of the form u(q; ) T , where q is the quantity consumed,  is a parameter
a¤ecting demand, and T is the payment for consumption. The function u satises
u(0; )  0; u  0 and uq  0. Consumers gain information about their preferences
in two stages: rst they learn a parameter , which does not enter directly into their
utility function, then they learn . The distribution of  depends on , and write
the distribution function for  given  as F (; ). We assume that higher values of
 make higher values of  more likely, i.e. that F(; )  0. Crucially, we make
the assumption that the support of  does not depend on , and say this support is
[L; H ]. The distribution function for  is G() with support [L; H ].
The rm o¤ers a family of tari¤s from which a consumer must choose after  is
known but before  is known. Let the family of tari¤s be indexed by , and so a
consumer is free to choose to buy from any tari¤ T (q; ). Given a particular family
of tari¤s T (q; ), dene
s(; )  max
q  0
: u(q; )  T (q; )
and write q(; ) to be the quantity that solves the above problem. Then, in the usual
way, if the type  consumer chooses the tari¤ T (; ^) she obtains expected surplus
v(; ^) 
Z H
L
u(q(; ^); )(1  F (; )) d + s(L; ^) (1)
and the rm obtains expected prot ofZ H
L
f[u(q(; ^); )  cq(; ^)] f(; )  u(q(; ^); )(1  F (; ))g d
 s(L; ^) : (2)
(Here, f  F.) Thus in doing this we have eliminated the underlying tari¤ T (; ^)
and expressed consumer surplus and prot given  and ^ in terms of the demand
prole q(; ^) and the minimal surplus term s(L; ^). Clearly, provided the function
q(; ^) is (weakly) increasing in , a tari¤ T (; ^) can be found that induces the
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demand prole q(; ^). We can therefore think of the rm as choosing q(; ^) and
s(L; ^) rather a family of tari¤s T (; ).
What remains to do is to ensure that the scheme is incentive compatible and that
the type  consumer chooses ^ = . Write
V () = max
L^H
: v(; ^)
where v is given by (1). Clearly, if the type  chooses ^ =  then
V 0() =  
Z H
L
u(q(; ); )F(; ) d  0 : (3)
In particular, V () is increasing in  and so if the participation constraint is satised
for the lowest type  = L it is satised for all types. Therefore, it must be optimal
from the rms point of view to set V (L) = 0. We deduce from (3) that under any
incentive compatible scheme that satises the participation constraints, the rent of
the type  is given by
V () =  
Z 
L
Z H
L
u(q(; ^); )F(; ^) d d^ : (4)
From (1), the term s(L; ) must then be given by
s(L; ) = V () 
Z H
L
u(q(; ^); )(1  F (; )) d (5)
where V () is given by (4).
Lemma 1 If the function s(L; ) in (1) is given by (5) above, then the type 
consumer will choose ^ =  in (1) provided that q(; ) is (weakly) increasing in .
Proof. Substituting for s(L; ^) as dened in (5) into (1) and di¤erentiating with
respect to ^ yields
v^(; ^) =
Z H
L
uq(q(; ^); )q(; ^)[F (; ^)  F (; )] d :
Therefore, since uq is assumed to be non-negative and q is assumed in the statement
of the lemma to be non-negative, the function v(; ^) is increasing in ^ for ^  
and increasing in ^ for ^   and hence is maximized at ^ =  as required. 
(Note that, although it is necessary for implementability that q be increasing in
, we do not claim that it is necessary, only su¢ cient, that q be increasing in .)
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We can now write the rms total prot purely in terms of the demand prole
q(; ). From (2), the rms prot from the type  consumer isZ H
L
u(q(; ); )f(; ) d   V ()
and so the rms total prot is just
 =
Z H
L
Z H
L
[u(q(; ); )  cq(; )] f(; ) d   V ()

dG() :
But using integration by parts and the relationship (3) yieldsZ H
L
V () dG() =
Z H
L
Z H
L
 u(q(; ); )F(; )(1 G()) dd
and hence total prots can be expressed as
 =
Z H
L
Z H
L
f[u(q(; ); )  cq(; )] f(; )g()
+ u(q(; ); )F(; )(1 G())g d d : (6)
Therefore, the candidate for the prot-maximizing quantity prole is
q(; ) maximizesq  0 : u(q; )  cq   u(q; ) F(; )(1 G())
f(; )g()
: (7)
Provided this function is weakly increasing in both  and , and this requires a
joint condition on the functional forms of u; F and G, then (7) certainly gives the
prot-maximizing demand prole.
EXAMPLE: Let u(q; ) = u(q) and F (; ) = 1  e =.
In this case the utility function takes the multiplicative form often used in models
of nonlinear pricing, and the parameter  is exponentially distributed with mean .
From (7), the candidate demand prole q(; ) maximizes
u(q)  cq   u(q)1 G()
g()
=

1  1 G()
g()

u(q)  cq :
This function is increasing in both  and  provided the standard hazard rate con-
dition that (1   G())=(g()) is decreasing holds. (Demand is zero when (1  
G())=(g())  1.) Notice that this example has the feature that each tari¤T (q; )
is just a two-part tari¤ with marginal price equal to
c
1  (1 G())=(g())
and so the prot-maximizing strategy is to o¤er consumers a menu of two-part tari¤s.
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